某英文报纸就国务院刚通过的《反外国不当域外管辖条例》来采访，就他们的问题汇报我的一点学习心得：

Dear X,

Thank you for your insightful questions. Below are some of my thoughts for your consideration:

1. Why now? What message is Beijing sending? Defensive shield or “Chinese long-arm”?

China has indeed been living with foreign sanctions and long‑arm jurisdiction for many years. What changed is not the existence of pressure, but its scope, intensity, and normalization. Over the past few years, unilateral and secondary sanction, especially by the US, have increasingly targeted third‑party conduct, global shipping, energy trade, finance, and technology licensing. From Beijing’s perspective, this amounts to an attempt to reshape global economic behaviour through domestic law, rather than traditional diplomacy or multilateral mechanisms.

The timing suggests two messages. First, internally, the leadership is institutionalising counter‑sanctions responses, moving from ad hoc political reactions to predictable legal governance. Second, externally, Beijing is signalling that persistent reliance on long‑arm jurisdiction will now encounter structured legal resistance, rather than case‑by‑case diplomacy.

On whether this is “defensive” or the birth of a “Chinese long‑arm”: formally and narratively, China frames these rules as defensive countermeasures, which have been proclaimed as a response to American/Western measures deemed inconsistent with international law and basic norms of jurisdiction. That said, once China reserves the right to impose countermeasures, prohibit compliance, and list foreign entities, the line between defence and projection inevitably becomes blurred. At this stage, this is best understood not as symmetrical expansion, but as legal deterrence: raising the cost for others of weaponising domestic law against Chinese actors.

2. How does this Regulation fit with existing laws? Is it an “instruction manual”?

This Regulation does not stand alone. It sits below major framework statutes such as the National Security Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Anti‑Foreign Sanctions Law, and above earlier, more fragmented departmental rules, notably the 2021 MOFCOM blocking rules.

Its importance lies in operational detail. Where earlier laws established principles and counter‑sanction authorities, this Regulation functions as a procedural instruction manual to stipulate on:

how foreign measures are identified and assessed,
who coordinates across agencies,
when prohibition orders are issued, and
how litigation, retaliation, and compliance supervision work in practice.

In that sense, it is less about creating new powers, and more about making existing powers usable, especially in courtrooms, compliance departments, and administrative enforcement.

3. Is this directly about the US blockade / Iran‑related sanctions? What can it do in practice?

The Regulation is deliberately general, avoiding explicit references to the US, Iran, or the Strait of Hormuz. But its design clearly reflects scenarios where secondary sanctions disrupt energy trade, shipping insurance, payment clearing, or port access.
Legally, the Regulation allows China to do three things relevant here:

Prohibit compliance: Chinese entities (and China‑based subsidiaries of foreign firms) may be prohibited from complying with certain foreign sanctions, forcing firms to choose between legal exposure in China and abroad.

Enable private litigation: Chinese firms harmed because a counterparty complied with foreign sanctions may sue in Chinese courts for compensation.

Impose countermeasures: Authorities may restrict trade, investment, or market access of foreign entities involved in implementing such sanctions.

In practical scenarios, a shipping insurer withdrawing cover due to US sanctions, or a logistics firm refusing services, could face civil claims or administrative consequences in China, even if fully compliant with foreign law elsewhere. That legal squeeze is intentional.

4. The three “legal weapons”: what really changes?

The Regulation’s innovation lies in systematisation:

Article 7 is about risk assessment, which formalises early identification of problematic foreign measures, signalling to companies that passive wait‑and‑see is no longer acceptable.

Article 13 is about prohibition orders, which elevate earlier blocking rules to a State Council level, strengthening their authority and enforceability.

Article 8's malicious entry list differs from the “Unreliable Entity List” by focusing less on trade misconduct and more on participation in enforcing foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction.

For foreign executives, the risk is not abstract. While the Regulation itself does not automatically impose travel bans or asset freezes, being listed creates a legal gateway for future restrictions, including entry limits or asset measures under other laws. The uncertainty itself is part of the deterrent.

5. Broader observation

In my view, the Regulation reflects China’s broader shift from reactive diplomacy to legalised geopolitical competition. Much like the EU’s blocking statute, it may be under‑enforced initially, but its true impact lies in compliance recalculation by multinational firms. Over time, we are likely to see selective test cases, especially in shipping, finance, and technology licensing.

Whether this stabilises or fragments global economic governance will depend less on the text itself than on how frequently and against whom it is used.

I hope the above observations are helpful.

Best wishes,
Jiangyu
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Jiangyu WANG (Dr.):: Professor, School of Law, City University of Hong Kong ; Director, Centre for Chinese and Comparative Law; Editor-in-Chief, Asia Pacific Law Review (APLR); Joint Editor-In-Chief, The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law (CJCL) (Oxford University Press); Subject Editor, Asian Journal of Comparative Law (AsJCL) (Cambridge University Press); Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong；Tel: (852) 3442 7026; Email: jiangyu.wang@cityu.edu.hk; Web: CityU Law.

王江雨博士:: 香港城市大學法律學院教授；中國法與比較法研究中心主任；《亚太法律评论》主编；《中國比較法學刊》（牛津大學出版社）共同主編；香港九龍達之路；電話：（852）3442 7026；電郵：jiangyu.wang@cityu.edu.hk; 網頁：城市大學法律學院；View my research at: SSRN; Google Scholar; ResearchGate